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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has traditionally possessed the benefits of being a
quick, efficient and economical alternate forum for resolving
disputes. However, for reasons discussed below, securities
arbitration now finds itself burdened with certain encumbrances
that may impede these benefits.
These encumbrances include the expansion of disclosure,
discovery, and awards. As a consequence, the arbitration process
has begun to take on many of the aspects of the judicial system.
While some of these aspects may be necessary, and indeed even
enhance the system, others may serve only to undermine the
basic reasons for arbitration's success in settling disputes
throughout the centuries.
What follows is a discussion of the past and the present
circumstances surrounding arbitration and the impact each has
had on the other.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The year is somewhere around 350 B.C. The place is Greece,
in and around the city of Athens. In this time and place lived a
* Director of Arbitration, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. [hereinafter
the Exchange]. This article does not necessarily reflect the views of the
Exchange or its arbitration program.
** Senior Arbitration Counsel, New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
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man who has come to be recognized as one of the greatest
thinkers of all time: Aristotle.'
The writings and teachings of this philosopher have been
discussed, quoted, and debated for over two thousand years. The
wisdom of his thoughts has been proven by the very fact that his
premises have endured for over two millennia. Aristotle's
concept of ethics as it related to humanity was that man
accomplished the greatest good and was happiest when
completely using that which makes him human.
This philosophy extended to politics as well, for in politics,
Aristotle believed the state existed to enable its citizens to live
happy and virtuous lives. Aristotle's concept of justice embodied
his view of the universe as an ideal world where all would be fair
and impartial. He believed that equity, defined as "fairness and
impartiality" rather than the law, was the method by which
disputes should be resolved. In the words of Aristotle, "Equity is
justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is equitable
to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps
equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and the
reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might
prevail. 2
Athens, the home of this great world philosopher Aristotle, is
also the home of one of the greatest architectural achievements
in the world, the Parthenon. Constructed in the fifth century B.C.
as a temple in honor of Athena, the Goddess of Wisdom and
Justice, its design and subsequent execution were considered
both mathematically and geometrically to be of the utmost
perfection. The Parthenon has had a brilliant history. However,
what follows is a glimpse of its downfall, not its brilliance.
The Parthenon remained intact and glorious for over a
thousand years. However, in 1687, the center portion was
destroyed by an explosion during an attack on Athens involving
the Turks and Venetians. In the eighteenth century, the beauty
of the remains was recognized once again. Since that time,
1. References to Greek history and philosophy are from THE COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Barbara Ann Chernow & George A. Vallasi eds., 5th ed.
1995).
2. Rudolphe J.A. DeSeife, Practice Guide §2:02, in GABRIEL M. WILNER,
DomxE Comm. ARBIRATiON (rev. ed. 1999) (quoting Aristotle).
ATTORNEYS AND ARBITRATION
reconstruction using as many of the original existing fragments as
possible has been an ongoing endeavor.
This reconstruction has been hindered by erosion and decay
resulting from the chemicals and pollutants of civilization. The
Parthenon, a survivor of time, attack, and battle, now finds itself
crumbling and in need of scaffolding and protection from the
destructive forces of air traffic, tourists, and other scavengers and
parasites.
The Parthenon is in danger of extinction. Aristotle, whose
footsteps echoed across the grounds of the Parthenon and whose
thoughts echoed those of Athena, was deeply concerned about
justice and the manner by which he felt justice would be best
served- arbitration and equity. These principles of justice were
embodied in the goddess Athena, whose temple, the Parthenon,
noted for its magnificent pillars, tries nobly to survive the
destructive forces of civilization.
111. EQUITY AND r=E NEW YolRK STOCK EXCHANGE
Pillars similar to those of the Parthenon adorn the facade of
the New York Stock Exchange. The Exchange has been both a
market place for capital formation and a regulator of its
participants since 1792. The Exchange has also been a forum for
the resolution of disputes through arbitration, based on the
principles of equity, since 1817.
In 1817, the disputes arbitrated at the Exchange were limited
to those between members involving the purchase of securities.
The process was considered so successful that in 1872, the
Exchange made arbitration available to customers of members
for disputes arising out of the business of its members.! The next
hundred years or so were relatively quiet and saw few substantive
changes. Since public awareness of the availability of arbitration
3. See Deborah Masucci & Robert S. Clemente, Securities Arbitration at
Self-Regulatory Organizations: NYSE and NASD Administration and
Procedures, in SEcurTIs ARBrrRATION 1996, at 99, 105 (PLI Corp. Law and
Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B4-7147, 1996) (outlining Exchange
developments in the nineteenth century).
4. Id.
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was limited, few cases were filed, although some investors did
select arbitration as the means to resolve their disputes.
It is important to remember that the reason individuals chose
arbitration was to receive equity-the same equity that Aristotle
wrote about when he expressed his preference for arbitration
over the law thousands of years ago. These people did not want
the constraints of a purely legal system. They chose arbitration
so that the decision would not be limited by the law, but based
instead on that which was fair and just for the particular situation.
This desire for equity was observed and noted in 1908 by
distinguished businessman and member of the New York Stock
Exchange, Henry Clews.5 Mr. Clews expressed his views about
the merit of arbitration as follows:
The large number of cases on record at the Exchange that
have been amicably settled by arbitration within the past few
years, in which law would have been formerly considered
indispensable, seem to point to a period, probably not far
distant, when arbitration will be the great and ultimate court
of appeal in the large majority of civil cases. Several
considerations will make it the most popular. It is cheaper,
less complicated, not subject to vexatious delay; it is more
equitable, and the members composing the Arbitration
Committees are business men, who are quick to discern,
accurate in perception, sound in judgment and decisive in
drawing their conclusions on business principles.
IV. ARBrrRATON AND TM SECURMES INDUSTRY
In 1987, public awareness of arbitration began a rapid climb
as a result of a Supreme Court decision. In Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon,7 the Court held that any claims
alleging a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could
be compelled to arbitration if the customer had signed an
agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause.8
Awareness continued to climb as the courts expanded the 1987
5. See HENRY CLEWS, FrY YuA s IN WALL STREET 561-62 (New York,
Arno Press 1973) (1908) (discussing the traditional advantages of arbitration).
6. Id.
7. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
8. Id. at 234-39.
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decision and made arbitration virtually the sole forum for
resolving securities industry-related disputes.9
As a result of this awareness, the number of claims filed at
the Exchange escalated dramatically, increasing more than three
hundred percent to peak at 1,623 in 1988.10 As the number of
claims grew, so did the concerns of Congress, regulators, and
consumer groups. These concerns focused on the perception that
arbitration did not afford the same procedural and due process
protection as those afforded in judicial proceedings. Over time,
in an attempt to alter this perception, rule amendments were
made to the Uniform Code of Arbitration." These amendments
for the most part codified existing practices that developed in
response to due process concerns.
V. THE EFFECTS OF HAVING ARBITRATION RESEMBLE LITIGATION
All actions have consequences which expand like the ripples
on a still lake. The codification of administrative practices has
had an effect on arbitration that continues to ripple throughout
the process. Arbitration, traditionally quick, efficient, and
economical, suddenly has become burdened with increased costs
and reduced efficiency. Collateral issues are litigated with
increasing frequency in the courts. Divergent interest groups pull
9. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995)
(upholding punitive damage award granted by arbitrators in the absence of
express provision to the contrary); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 23-31 (1991) (holding that a registered representative could be
compelled to arbitrate his claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and reaffirming that the Exchange's arbitration rules provide adequate
procedural safeguards of the rights of the parties); Rodriquez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are
enforceable, and overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
10. SEcuRImss INDUSTRY CONMRENCE ON ArrRAT[ON [hereinafter SICA],
TENm REPORT 37 (1998) [hereinafter SICA TENm REPORT]. The number of
claims filed at all securities forums combined peaked at 6,097 in 1988, and at
7,274 in 1995. Id. at 38.
11. See SICA, SImH REPORT 1-2 (1989) (describing extensive changes
made by SICA to the Uniform Code of Arbitration in line with concerns
voiced by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Congress)
[hereinafter SICA Sixm REPORT].
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at each other to make sure no one has an edge. Changes made to
the arbitration rules as a result of litigation over contested issues
have had unintended results in other cases.
One such unintended result concerned the "Time Limitation
Upon Submission" rule, also known as the "six-year rule.' 12 The
intent of this rule was to exclude stale claims from arbitration.
There was never any intent to preclude any other remedies
available through the courts." Nevertheless, when the timeliness
of claims filed became an issue in disputes involving limited
partnerships, the courts misinterpreted the six-year rule. Instead
of recognizing that the six-year rule went to eligibility for
submission to arbitration, the courts regarded the rule as a statute
of limitations which, if expired, eliminated recourse to the courts.
Furthermore, the courts bolstered their opinion by holding that
the signing of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate was akin to an
election of remedies, which also eliminated any recourse,
including use of the courts.14
VI. THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
While everyone argues over what to do to remedy the
unintended effects resulting from amendments, arbitration,
historically linked to equity, finds its identity merging with that of
the courts. As a result, traditional arbitration may find itself in
12. N.Y. STOCK ExcH. R. 603, in N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2,608 (1984).
See also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 7, reprinted in SICA TENTH REPORT,
supra note 8, at 14.
13. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23
FoDIIMs URn. L.J. 483, 493 (1996) ("It was never the intent of SICA to
invalidate claims by this rule, but merely to articulate that claims over six years
old could not be submitted to an SRO forum for arbitration.").
14. See Seth E. Lipner & Kenneth E. Meister, Eligibility (Six-Year) Rule,
63 FoRnimI L. Rv. 1533, 1534 (1995) (noting that New York courts have
interpreted the "six-year rule" like a statute of limitations, but without any
tolling provisions, and foreclosing arbitration as well as litigation after six
years). SICA subsequently amended Section 4 of the Uniform Code of
Arbitration to make clear that "any claim determined to be ineligible for
arbitration may be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction by any Claimant,
notwithstanding that a Submission Agreement had been filed, and as if no
arbitration agreement had been entered into by the parties." Uniform Code
of Arbitration § 4, supra note 11, at 13.
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danger of extinction. While the Parthenon erodes as the forces of
civilization attack its foundation with pollutants unknown at the
time of its creation, so too does arbitration erode as the forces of
the legal profession attack its foundation with what could also be
considered "pollutants."
What are these pollutants which threaten the existence of
arbitration? They are those things indigenous to the legal system
which are being introduced with ever-increasing rapidity into the
domain of equity. The question is not whether these legal
elements are appropriate or inappropriate; rather, the question is
whether the goal of arbitration, equity, is being enhanced or
encumbered. And if encumbered, will the result be erosion and
extinction?
Arbitration as a method of dispute resolution has a long, rich
tradition behind it. It has been a well-established means to settle
disputes quickly and economically, with origins tracing back to
the dawn of humanity, when man first sought the wisdom of a
tribal elder to determine who was wrong and who was right,
rather than destroy his foe with his stone ax. The tradition
continued and throughout early history, arbitration was used to
resolve disputes between buyers and sellers wherever commerce
was highly developed 6  There was no debate over who the
arbitrator would be, and no attempt to have an advantage over
your adversary by selecting an arbitrator who shared your point
of view. There was no arguing about what could or could not be
included with the pleadings. There was no arguing about
discovery, depositions, or interrogatories. There was no arguing
about objections, no badgering behavior, and no limitation of
remedies.17  To the contrary, each side sat down with the
arbitrator and presented his story, that is, his version of the facts,
as fully and completely as he could. At the conclusion, the
arbitrator made his decision based on everything he had heard.
15. See Rudolphe J.A. DeSeife, supra note 2, §2:01 (considering possible
prehistoric origins of arbitration).
16. See id. (describing early examples of commercial arbitration).
17. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, NASD Faces More Criticism on Arbitration,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1998, at Cl (discussing a controversial cap on punitive
damages awards proposed by the NASD).
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Today, there is arguing about virtually everything. With the
introduction of each new legal element or pollutant into the
domain of equity, new problems are created and new arguments
postured to deal with them. The pollutants themselves are easily
identified and fall into three main categories: disclosure,
discovery, and decisions.
It is noteworthy that in America, a few of the earliest
examples of arbitration occurred within the trades, including the
stock exchanges, with the Philadelphia Stock Exchange having
arbitration as early as 1790.18 In all of the early arbitration
hearings, lawyers were for the most part excluded. Rules existed
to exclude lawyers since, "[t]o permit participation by counsel as
a matter of right would be fatal to the efficacy of arbitration."'9
Now, it is the tools of lawyers that may be fatal to arbitration.
A. Disclosure
Prior to 1988, arbitrator selection was a reasonably simple
procedure. Individuals who had been approved to serve as
arbitrators were catalogued by city on 3" x 5" index cards. Each
card noted the person's name, address, telephone number, social
security number, and profession. Yellow cards signified security
arbitrators and blue cards signified public arbitrators.2
An attorney from the Exchange Arbitration Department
would appoint arbitrators for a particular claim by flipping
through the box, locating the appropriate city, pulling the cards,
and making phone calls to see who was available on the proposed
date and had no conflicts with any of the parties. A "hearing
notice," listing the names of the arbitrators and stating their
designation as "public" or "securities," was sent to the parties. If
the parties desired more information about any or all of the
18. See Rudolphe J.A. DeSeife, supra note 2, §2:04 & n.1 (describing early
arbitration tribunals in America).
19. Matter of Kayser (Skulnik), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1925, at 1417 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) (Wagner, J.), aff'd., 212 A.D. 870,208 N.Y.S. 885 (1st Dep't 1925).
20. Karen Kupersmith, A Perspective on the Role of the Arbitrator in
Securities Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOmsT L. REv. 297, 297 (1997) (reviewing
early Exchange arbitration procedures).
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arbitrators, they could make a request to the Arbitration
Department, and the information would be provided if possible.21
This reasonably simple procedure underwent a major
alteration following the McMahon decision in 1987. As a result
of McMahon and arbitration becoming the sole forum for
resolving securities industry-related disputes, many changes have
occurred, both in the selection process for arbitrators and in the
disclosures that arbitrators are required to make.'
The blue and yellow index cards have been replaced by
"profiles," four-page forms that are entered into a computerized
database. These profiles contain the information on the index
cards.2 They also contain information regarding the arbitrator's
employment history, a narrative of the arbitrator's business and
professional background, a list of all securities accounts and
relationships with brokerage firms, and a description of
arbitration experience and training.
However, the profiles do not cease there. Regulatory
information and information about bankruptcies, prior lawsuits
and arbitrations, felonies, and misdemeanors is requested and
required to be disclosed. The parties are also able to request
whatever additional information they desire about the
arbitrators.
The requests about the backgrounds of the arbitrators have
grown in both volume and depth of inquiry. It is not unusual to
have requests that ask for detailed information regarding an
arbitrator's personal history, past experience with litigation and
the legal process, employer, duties as an employee, background
21. Id.
22. See N.Y. STOCK ExcH. R. 607, in N.Y.S.E. GuIDE (CCH) 2,607 (1992)
(governing designation of arbitrators); N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 610, in N.Y.S.E.
GUIDE (CCH) 2,610 (1989) (mandating certain disclosures by arbitrators);
See also NYSE Arbitration Establishes Program to Offer Multiple Choices on
Arbitrator Selection, SEc. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1998, at 7-8 (discussing
changes to arbitrator selection procedures at the Exchange, including
randomly generated lists and the availability of peremptory challenges); List
Selection Program Implemented on Schedule by NASDR Arbitration, SEc. ARB.
COmmNTATOR, Nov. 1998, at 6 (reporting the implementation of computerized
selection procedures for arbitrators by the NASD, and its move to revise
arbitrator profiles).
23. Some SRO forums have questionnaires of up to 16 pages.
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and experience in the type of investment at issue and other types
of investment, testimony if ever an expert witness, and
involvement in other cases in different arbitration forums.
These requests closely resemble the type of information that
an attorney would try to obtain using the voir dire procedure in
the courtroom. The role of arbitrators, however, more closely
resembles that of judges than of jurors. ' It is, therefore, arguable
that incorporating a courtroom-type procedure into the realm of
arbitration may serve to undermine and weaken the very
foundation of the pillars that hold the arbitration forum in place.
B. Discover
Some critics say that the McMahon decision was actually the
downfall of securities arbitration. Prior to 1987, and traditionally
since the earliest days of arbitration, there was little discovery, if
any. Discovery, with its inherent costs and delays, is perhaps the
single greatest incentive to avoid traditional litigation and choose
arbitration.
However, after McMahon, compromises were made in
response to those "trial lawyers" who lobbied and campaigned in
the name of "the public investor" and his courtroom procedural
safeguards.2 One such compromise pertained to discovery. Trial
lawyers argued that, if they were required to arbitrate as opposed
to litigate, they must have access to full and formal pre-hearing
discovery procedures.
Before this turn of events, arbitration was truly fast and
efficient. Despite the lack of formal discovery processes, parties
were able to prepare adequately their cases. Previously, the sole
discovery provision required the parties to "cooperate in the
voluntary exchange of such documents and information as will
serve to expedite the arbitration."26  Rarely, and only when
24. See SICA, Tim ARBrrRATOR'S MANUAL 34 (1996) ("Arbitrators are
quasi-judicial officers ....").
25. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 20, supra note 11, at 25-27
(governing exchange of documents and information); SICA SIXTi REPORT,
supra note 9, at 2 (noting amendments to the Uniform Code of Arbitration, §
20, to accommodate discovery).
26. N.Y. STOCK ExcI. R. 619 (1985) (amended 1995) (on file with the
Fordham Finance, Securities, and Tax Law Forum).
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warranted, could a party seek the arbitrators' intervention in
obtaining necessary discovery.
Unfortunately, as this practice was not acceptable to those
accustomed to formal discovery in litigation and the motion
practice that accompanies it, the compromise regarding discovery
led to the birth of the "pre-hearing" process. Accordingly, a new
rule was implemented in 1989 to address the concerns of those
wanting formal discovery. 7 While this new rule still required the
parties to cooperate voluntarily,' a formal discovery procedure
was added to the process." The rule now provides a time frame
for making and responding to discovery requests." It also
preserves the laudable, if impractical, requirements that the
parties cooperate voluntarily and that "the parties shall endeavor
to resolve disputes regarding an information request prior to
serving any objection to the request"3 1
Stalemates over discovery continue to occur in spite of the
new rule. In this situation, a party may request a pre-hearing
conference. Initially, arbitration counsel, a neutral administrator
whose job is to assist the parties and keep the case on track
towards a swift resolution, intervenes to aid the parties in
reaching a mutually agreed upon resolution of discovery disputes.
At the Exchange, a well-seasoned staff attorney,32 who has
reviewed the pleadings and is familiar with the practical aspects
of most types of claims and the documents generated by the
securities industry, helps the parties resolve discovery disputes
27. N.Y. STocK ExcH. R. 619 (1989) (amended 1995) (on file with the
Fordham Finance, Securities, and Tax Law Forum).
28. See id(a).
29. Rule 619, as amended in 1989, was expanded into six subsections: (a)
Requests for Documents and Information, (b) Document Production and
Information Exchange, (c) Pre-Hearing Exchange, (d) Pre-Hearing
Conference, (e) Decisions by Selected Arbitrator, (f) Subpoenas, and (g)
Power to Direct Appearance and Production of Documents. Id.
30. See N.Y. STOCK ExcH. R. 619(e), in N.Y.S.E. GUDE (CCH) 2,619
(1995) (as amended) (expanding provisions governing pre-hearing exchange of
documents). Rule 619 preserves the calendar requirements for responses to
information and documents. Id. (b).
31. Id. (b).
32. The Exchange staff attorneys' average experience in arbitration is
approximately 13 years.
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based upon what arbitrators have typically ordered in the past
under similar circumstances.
Unfortunately, the intervention of the staff attorney does not
always settle the parties' differences of opinions over what should
be produced. As noted earlier, trial lawyers' familiarity with
motion practice leads them in far too many cases to move
towards the next step, a pre-hearing conference with an
arbitrator. While in some instances it may be necessary for an
arbitrator to intervene for the resolution 'of a discovery dispute,
more often than not the party's true purpose in requesting an
arbitrator is to provide a preview of their case theory. An
attorney speaking at a seminar on arbitration not long ago stated
that he used the pre-hearing conference for precisely that
purpose and would even begin conferences by delivering what
was essentially his opening statement.33 Apparently, trial lawyers
may be unable to remove themselves from the courtroom
mindset, which focuses on gaining a psychological advantage. As
such, this is a tactic far afield from the purpose of arbitration and
the reason arbitrators are appointed.
Today, one often sees multiple discovery requests seeking in
excess of fifty items. Yet once an arbitrator becomes involved
and a pre-hearing conference is held, many of the items are
withdrawn or agreed upon by the parties. When the issue of what
should be produced is decided, the parties are able to accomplish
their true purpose in seeking the pre-hearing conference: making
motions and testing their theory of the case. Whether conducted
over the telephone or before a panel, these pre-hearing
conferences too often consume the better part of a day, which is
neither efficient nor economical.
However, even these new "courtroom-like" procedures did
not satisfy all the desires of litigators. Consequently, a call was
made for required disclosure, an experiment which was not
successful in the courts. The underlying intent apparently was to
33. Speaker's comments at Arbitration Comes of Age, PLI Securities
Arbitration Seminar (1997).
34. Constantine N. Katsoris, An Arbitrator's Perspective, in SECURrTES
ARBrIRATION 1998, at 307, 312 (PLI Corp. Law and Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. BO-OOiK, 1998) (noting that a call for required lists of documents
has been made by various industry and investors' bar groups).
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remove the arbitrators' discretion and impose an artificial burden
upon one side or the other to produce an unreasonable and
unnecessary amount of documents.
Initially, there was a proposal for documents to be produced
according to "suggestive" lists that were usually very broad and
dealt with claims brought both by investors and employees.
However, trial lawyers remained dissatisfied. For the last several
years there has been a drive toward mandatory disclosure. One
major arbitration forum just obtained approval of a rule that
contains extensive lists of "presumptively discoverable"
documents."
Not only does mandatory discovery undermine the basic
principles of arbitration, it also undermines the arbitrators'
authority. After all, requiring certain documents to be disclosed
in every case or even in certain categories of cases reflects a lack
of confidence in arbitrators' abilities. If arbitrators are not
capable of deciding discovery issues, how can they possibly be
trusted to decide the cases themselves?
One could surmise from what has happened recently that
arbitration is nearing its end and that traditional litigation will
once again prevail. That may be far from reality. In spite of the
fact that trial lawyers continue their push for arbitration to mimic
courtroom litigation, parties maintain their faith in the wisdom of
the arbitrators and the usefulness of arbitration. Most plaintiffs'
lawyers realize that time constraints and economics dictate that
survival may not be possible if all cases are litigated. Defense
lawyers, particularly those in-house, also know that they cannot
afford to litigate most cases. This, coupled with the fact that most
disputes are eventually settled, forces most trial lawyers to seek
the benefits of arbitration.
The fact that discovery in arbitration is not as closely
supervised as it is in court further complicates the efficiency of
35. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
Creating a Discovery Guide for Use in NASD Arbitrations, Exchange Act
Release No. 41,833, 64 Fed. Reg. 49,256, at 49,257 (Sep. 10, 1999) (granting
permission to NASD Regulation to formalize the discovery process by
creating a "Discovery Guide" which deems certain documents "presumptively
discoverable").
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the arbitration process. Substantial abuses and delays occur,
resulting in crucial matters often being left until the last minute.
Needless to say, the outcome is a disruption of the hearing
schedule and more inconvenience to the parties. Indeed, in a
recent decision pertaining to discovery in arbitration, Judge Jose
A. Cabranes of the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, noted the strong federal policy underlying arbitration,
and said that in private tribunals, the use of broad-ranging
discovery as permitted under federal statute "would undermine
one of the significant advantages of arbitration."'37
And so, the attempt of trial lawyers to expand and
manipulate discovery to serve their own ends creates yet another
undermining of the foundation that supports the pillars of
arbitration. The erosion continues, and the support system
sustaining arbitration in its pure form of equity becomes even
more perilous.
C. Awards
The final challenge is the arbitrators' award. Traditionally, in
securities arbitration as well as in other areas of arbitration,
arbitrators' awards have been short and simple, usually stating
whether the claimant lost or won, and the amount of any
recovery.
The New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Rules provide
for the form and content of the awards.3 ' They must contain the
36. With this in mind, the Exchange is seeking to foster mutually agreed-
upon solutions. In 1998, the Exchange adopted two pilot programs aimed at
assisting dispute resolution. One pilot calls for arbitrators to be appointed and
an administrative conference scheduled within 30 days after the answer is
filed. The administrative conference is designed to explore ways to expedite
the process, focusing on discovery and establishing deadlines for the
production of documents. The second pilot provides for early consideration of
mediation. Both pilot programs are intended to expedite large cases-those in
excess of $500,000. It is hoped that with these procedures, the arbitration
process will be better administered by having the arbitrators, as opposed to the
parties, control the pre-hearing process.
37. National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Steams & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191
(2nd Cir. 1999).
38. N.Y. STOCK Excn. R. 627, in N.Y.S.E. GuiDF (CCH) [ 2,627 (1992).
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names of the parties and their counsel, a summary of the issues,
the damages and any other relief requested, the damages and
relief awarded, a statement regarding any other issues resolved,
the names of the arbitrators, the date of filing, the date of award,
the dates and number of hearing sessions, the location of the
hearing, and the arbitrators' signatures.3 ' However, the Rules
have no specific provision for an opinion of the arbitrators
regarding the reasons for their award or lack thereof.' There
may be many reasons for this.
Primarily, unlike a legal proceeding, cases heard in equity
have no precedential value-each case heard by the arbitrators
stands or falls on the merits of the facts and issues presented,
rather than on what has transpired previously in other unrelated
matters. Equity is unique in this respect.
Additionally, the grounds for an appeal are very limited.41
And with such limited grounds, an opinion for the basis of the
award loses much of its importance. Also, while judges have law
clerks who supply them with substantiation for their opinions,
there are no such law clerks to assist the arbitrators, not all of
whom are lawyers or even familiar with legal protocol.
There has been much discussion over the years of greater use
of "reasoned awards."4 2 These reasoned awards set forth the
basic grounds for the arbitrators' decision. They need not
resemble an appellate court opinion, but rather just be a brief
recitation of why the arbitrators decided the issues the way they
39. See id (e).
40. See SICA, ARBmRATON PROCEDURES 20 (1996) (providing that a party
may request an opinion of the arbitrators no later than the hearing date). Any
awards, reports, or opinions "shall be made publicly available in accordance
with the policies of the sponsoring self-regulatory organization." THE
ARBrrRATOR'S MANuAL, supra note 22, at 34.
41. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (McKinney 1999) (citing the grounds for an
appeal of an arbitration award as: (i) corruption, fraud, or misconduct in
procuring the award; (ii) partiality of an arbitrator; (iii) an arbitrator exceeded
his power; or, (iv) failure to follow the procedure of N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 75.)
See also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (grounds for vacation of
arbitration award).
42. See Constantine N. Katsoris & John F.X. Peloso, Punitive Damages, 63
FoRDHam L. REv. 1571, 1574 (1995) (noting NASD consideration of a
proposal for "reasoned" punitive damages awards in arbitration).
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did. Arbitrators generally use this vehicle when they dismiss a
case on statutory grounds such as a statute of limitation, when the
award is less than what was sought, when one party's conduct is
particularly egregious, or when the claim is wholly without merit.
There are valid arguments both for and against pushing for
courtroom-like decisions. Arguably, the parties want to know the
basis for their win or loss; such knowledge permits closure and
eliminates the frustration of not knowing the reasons for the
award, particularly when the decision is not a full and decisive
victory. Yet those cases that actually proceed to hearing, rather
than being settled, are cases where both parties are often
absolutely convinced that they are entirely correct on all issues.
Under these circumstances, where nothing but total victory will
suffice, it is unlikely that any decision, despite how much
reasoning it contains, will satisfy the losing party.
The lack of legal training possessed by the arbitrators, the
lack of law clerks, the lack of precedential value of cases heard in
equity, and even the fact that the award may represent a
compromise of three individuals, argue against expanded
decisions. For now, there is no way to know whether decisions
resembling those issued in courts of law will become a part of
arbitration. And if they do, will they contribute to the
undermining of the foundations of the pillars supporting
arbitration?
VII. CONCLUSION
Arbitration has survived and blossomed through not only
centuries, but millennia. One can be virtually certain that, unlike
the Parthenon, its future will be secure on the foundations that
support it. So many things are but a passing fancy, as seen by
fads and trends which come and fade so quickly, they merit
hardly a notation in books and annals of history. Arbitration, a
survivor throughout time, has proven its worth and value. May
this be recognized by all who benefit from its vast advantages and
eternal equitable powers. As with many other institutions that
survived the pendulum swings of opposing views, arbitration shall
again return to balance the goal of expeditious dispute resolution
against due process.
